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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper evaluates the performance of Italian banks during the 2006-2009 period. Banks are 
analysed according to their business models and their main activities. The analysis focuses on 
both cooperative and commercial banks. By contrast to commercial banks, Italian cooperative 
banks do not perceive profit-making as a principle itself. These banks have been able to 
accumulate capital and provide credit to customers despite the ongoing crisis. On average, they 
manage their loan portfolio better than commercial banks. Findings suggest that cooperative 
banking in Italy should be encouraged due to its positive contribution to economic development 
and possibly financial stability.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
he aim of this paper is to analyse the recent performance of Italian banks, particularly during the 
2007-2008 financial crisis. It therefore focuses on a topic that has been central to scholarly 
investigation in the past few years. Different types of financial intermediaries are evaluated 
according to the influence of profit-seeking on their business strategies. Specifically, the paper centres on two 
groups of banks - on the one hand, commercial banks; namely, privately owned banks that provide services both to 
the general public and to private firms - on the other hand, cooperative banks; namely, those with a “per capita” 
voting mechanism that provide services mainly to cooperative members, households, and small and medium-sized 
enterprises (SMEs).  
 
A number of studies have shown that Italian cooperative banks and European cooperative banks are, on 
average, less profitable, yet more stable due to both higher solvency ratios (Hesse and Cihak, 2007; Gutierrez, 2008) 
and a number of advantages resulting from relationship banking such as a proximity to customers (Boot, 1999; Boot 
and Thakor, 2000; Cesarini, 2003; Di Salvo et al., 2004). A sound banking system is built primarily upon profitable 
and well-capitalised banks. This paper attempts to evaluate whether such an argument applies to the Italian market. 
Furthermore, the argument that a well-developed cooperative credit network increases the stability of the Italian 
financial system is indirectly discussed. 
 
In principle, commercial banks are profit-driven. They tend to assume large risks. By contrast, cooperative 
banks tend to adopt conservative business strategies and stakeholder maximisation policies. Cooperative banks are 
customer-oriented and are particularly efficient in maintaining long-lasting relationships with their members and 
customers. Members at cooperative banks tend to enjoy easier access to credit. Stated otherwise, these banks are 
particularly strong in relationship banking, a type of banking which enables banks to make informed decisions in the 
provision of loans and financial services as a result of in-depth knowledge of customers’ business (Baas and 
Schrooten, 2005a). In their loans-granting process, they are able to use “soft information” to substantiate their 
decisions (Berger and Udell, 2002; Petersen, 2002). 
 
By evaluating different types of banks operating in the Italian market, an attempt is made to outline policy 
implications for the stability of the national financial system. Stability is defined both as a situation in which 
financial markets fulfil their allocation function in a satisfactory manner and as the stability of key institutions 
T 
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(Würz, 2005). The need to discuss such a topic is derived, for instance, from the argument that in any banking 
activity, there is a relationship between profitability and liquidity with important implications for financial stability. 
Banks manage profitability by trying to beat market averages and keep profits steady and predictable (Van Groening 
and Brajovic-Bratanovic, 2000; Valla et al., 2006). These issues need to be re-discussed in the aftermath of the 2007-
2008 financial crisis.  
 
Findings suggest that major differences exist in the business models of cooperative and commercial banks. 
Arguably, they originate from individual features of banks, their strategic goals, technical profile and organisational 
structure. Italian cooperative banks are efficient in providing credit to their customers despite the ongoing crisis. 
They have good management of the loan portfolio, which is qualitatively better than that of commercial banks. 
Results further suggest that the presence of cooperative credit banks translates into positive outcomes in terms of 
financial stability: diversification of financial institutions within the market provides a better balance of shareholder 
and stakeholder values. This, in turn, may positively affect financial stability.  
 
COOPERATIVE BANKS IN THE ITALIAN MARKET 
 
As Angelini and Cetorelli (2003) observe, Italy is one of the most important European economies. The 
Italian banking system has undergone a process of restructuring and significant consolidation in the 1990s. 
Developments have been multifaceted and had influenced different groups of banks and several financial 
intermediaries. Competition has increased as a result of the financial integration at the EU level. While cooperative 
banks had consolidated their position in local markets, commercial banks and some larger popular banks privileged 
growth strategies on a national level or in the European markets. As a result of the above-mentioned changes, 
commercial and cooperative banks play an even more important role for the Italian financial system.  
 
In Italy, cooperative credit banks relate into a well-developed commercial network with important historical 
roots and market advantages (Angelini and Cetorelli, 2003; Finocchiaro, 2007; Leonardi, 2009). In order to better 
appraise such a network, it is important to note that European cooperative banking has a long-standing tradition 
dating back to the first half of the 19
th
 century. It gradually emerged as a response to the market inefficiencies and 
imperfections resulting from the financial activity of commercial banks at that time. Whereas savings banks 
flourished from 1810 onwards to overcome opportunistic behaviour by banks, cooperative banks flourished from the 
mid-19
th
 century onwards to overcome opportunistic behaviour by borrowers (Hansmann, 1996; Fonteyne, 2007).  
 
As in other European countries, Italian cooperative banks managed to overcome such inefficiencies because 
of the fact that members and consumers from local communities financed their own development and were directly 
involved in decision-making processes. As noted by Fonteyne, “within small communities, relatively intimate 
knowledge of each other’s credit and trustworthiness ensured that loans were only provided to borrowers who could 
be expected to repay them. The financial incentives members had to monitor each other and the relatively small and 
homogeneous base of early cooperatives ensured that peer pressure provided incentives for borrowers to repay” 
(Fonteyne, 2007, 9). 
 
Despite a changing environment and increasing market competition, many Italian cooperative banks still 
retain some of their original traits. Trust is an important concept in banking theory and remains a central value in 
cooperative banking as it developed in several Italian regions. Why it is important to stress the concept of trust and 
cooperative values in contemporary banking? Groeneveld and de Vries (2009, 11) provide a good answer to this 
question by looking at the aftermath of the financial crisis and potential developments in financial intermediation. 
They assert that “in the global financial system, integrity and ethics will play a more important role at financial 
institutions than in the past. Traditionally, the financial sector thrives on trust. At the same time, we expect the strong 
focus on short-term gains and materialism”. 
 
Profitability in Cooperative Banking 
 
 Profit-making is essential for banks to operate in the long-term. Banks play a major role in channelling 
funds for productive purposes. Therefore, they provide a fundamental contribution to economic development. Profit 
is also a major driver of the developments and the implementation of new financial services and products in the 
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Italian banking sector:  
 
 On the one hand, Italian banks differ with respect to the assumed importance of both short- and long-term 
profit maximisation. 
 On the other hand, they differ in terms of profit allocation policies, which involve a number of risks; for 
example, operational risks, business risks, credit risk, liquidity risk, interest rate risk, as well as those 
related to their financial structure (Van Greuning and Brajovic-Bratanovic, 2000; Matthews and Thompson, 
2008).  
 
 One can safely assume that such differences have an impact on the market structure of the banking sector. 
 
 Despite adopting a rather broad definition of “cooperative banks”, results from several empirical studies 
show that Italian cooperative banks are more cost-efficient than their competitors (Girardone et al., 2004; Turati, 
2004). It can be argued that commercial banks tend to pursue strategies aimed at short-term profit maximisation. 
Conversely, by registering large amounts of their annual earnings as reserves, cooperative banks tend to apply safer 
business strategies. As most other non-financial cooperatives, they apply an organisational model based on a 
governance in which the control of rights is exercised democratically and membership is voluntary.  
 
 By reference to Groeneveld and Sjauw-Koen-Fa (2009), it can be observed that the business model of 
Italian cooperative banks shows a number of specifics; for example, 1) corporate governance based on member 
ownership, 2) conservative business strategy, 3) high level of capitalisation, and 4) focus on retail banking. Despite 
not perceiving profit as a goal itself, they need to implement effective strategies to ensure profitability and offset the 
above-mentioned risks - “robust profit growth is also important for cooperative banks to safeguard their continuity 
and continuing development. Healthy profitability is a prerequisite, but not a goal itself. This means that cooperative 
banks can, in challenging times, including the present credit crisis, stay behind the customers longer than their listed 
rivals” (Groeneveld and de Vries, 2009, 11).   
 
 Table 1 summarises the specifics in terms of organisational structure, governance and business of, on the 
one hand, Italian cooperative banks; and, on the other hand, commercial banks. 
 
 
Table 1:  Organizational Differences between Italian Cooperative and Commercial Banks 
 Cooperative Banks Commercial Banks 
Corporate governance Member ownership Shareholder ownership 
Business strategy OTH (originate to hold) OTD (originate to distribute) 
Profitability Consumer surplus maximisation Short-term profit maximisation 
Line of business Relationship banking and retail segment Diversified 
Legal reserves 70% of net profits retained as reserves 10% of net profits retained as reserves 
Status Do not issue equity Issue equity and tradable shares 
Source:  the authors 
 
 
METHODOLOGY AND DATA 
 
The following question is crucial to the present study: “What is the best indicator for measuring 
profitability?” The answer depends on which part of the balance sheet one refers to. There are different measures 
and ratios that account for profitability in financial intermediation. This paper focuses on the return on equity 
(ROE); namely, the ratio that is commonly used by banks as the “ultimate performance scorecard”. While some 
scholars and policymakers view this ratio as the most reliable indicator of profitability, others have criticised its 
extensive use (Karr, 2005; Tumpel-Gugerell, 2005; De Bonis, 2008, 114-116). Regardless of which position one 
subscribes to, ROE is a standard ratio. As such, it is a valuable tool for the analysis of both local banks and large 
international banks. This ratio is suitable for making a comparison between different types of banks. Needless to say, 
as with other analytical tools and methods, it needs to be used with judgment and caution. 
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In the present paper, a model is developed in which ROE relates to a number of independent variables. 
Such a model enables to identify the sources and the structure of profitability among cooperative and commercial 
banks. In the following paragraphs, data sources and the sample of banks are discussed. A number of papers have 
been considered for deriving the model. The paper that mostly supported the final selection of independent variables 
is a study developed by Angela Romagnoli (2007) in which a set of variables is defined so to measure the 
profitability of Italian banks and asset returns on listed shares.  
 
In order to derive the model, some of the original variables to measure the profitability of commercial 
banks have been omitted so as to better appraise the specifics of cooperative banks. For instance, Dividend-Payouts 
have been omitted due to the fact that they play a minor role in cooperative credit banking - cooperative banks 
“often face binding restrictions on their pay-out policies. At many cooperatives, there are statutory or legal 
restrictions that put limits on shareholder remuneration” (Fonteyne, 2007, 43). Furthermore, instead of using the 
Interbank Rate as a measure of liquidity for Italian cooperative banks, Liquid Assets over Total Assets are used as a 
standard measure of liquidity since cooperative banks do not engage in the interbank market as actively as 
commercial banks. The final variables are described in Table 2.  
 
 
Table 2:  Description of Variables used in the Model 
Measure Of Variable Short Definition 
Asset Quality 
Total Capital Ratio TCR 
Total capital adequacy ratio under the 
Basle rules. It measures Tier 1 + Tier 2 
capital  
Net Loans on Total Assets NLTA 
Indicates the percentage of the assets of 
the bank tied up in loans 
Net Loans on Deposits NLTDB 
A ratio with deposits and borrowings as 
its denominator (for the exception of 
capital instruments) 
Quality Of Investment 
Loan Loss Reserves on Gross Loans LLRGL 
It is a reserve for losses expressed as a 
percentage of total loans 
Loan Loss Provisions on Net 
Interest Revenue 
LLPNIR 
Defines the relationship between 
provisions in the profit and loss account 
and the interest income over a given 
period 
Profitability 
Net Interest Margin NIM 
The net interest income expressed as a 
percentage of earning assets 
Non Operative Items & Tax on 
Average Assets 
NOITAA 
A measure of costs and tax as a 
percentage of assets 
Return on Equity ROE 
A standard measure of the return on 
shareholder funds 
Cost-to-Income Ratio CIR 
Defines changes in the cost/asset ratio 
and in the interest margin 
Recurring Earning Power REP 
A measure of after tax profits adding 
back provisions for bad debts as a 
percentage of Total Assets 
Liquidity Liquid Assets over Total Assets LQVT 
Derived by dividing liquid assets by 
total assets 
Source:  BankScope 
 
 
Data Sources 
 
The model is developed on balance sheet data from a sample of 60 cooperative banks and 60 commercial 
banks in Italy. Despite acknowledging that different levels of efficiency exist among banks operating in different 
Italian regions and geographic areas (Battaglia and Ricci, 2008), the analysis is developed at a national level. Data 
are obtained through the BankScope database provided by Bureau van Dyke. They refer to the 4-years period 2006-
2009. This is the period of severe financial distress and recession and the year just before the spread of the crisis. It 
thus provides a “worst case” scenario for the analysis of banking behaviour. Such argument is substantiated by the 
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idea that the macroeconomic situation affects the performance of the interbank market and the banking system as a 
whole and, therefore, of single banks as well (Quagliariello, 2008; Bank of England, 2009; Freixas, 2009). 
 
 A major problem in the sample selection relates to the definition of cooperative banks. Some studies 
classify all banks with a “per capita” voting mechanism; for example, mutual and rural banks as cooperative banks 
(Battistin et al., 2006). Taken together, these banks account for approximately 30% of both loans and deposits in the 
Italian banking system. However, significant differences exist between such categories of banks. In the construction 
of the database, insights from Gutierrez (2008) have been taken into account. Following her classification, the 
present study centres on the “banche di credito cooperativo” only. Such a choice adds substance to the analysis and 
thereby helps avoid confusion in the interpretation of results. This may, in turn, better substantiate our tentative 
policy guidelines, as listed at the end of the paper.  
 
 A second methodological problem in the present study refers to the treatment of outliers and missing values 
in the dataset. A very small number of banks have been excluded from the data set due to a large number of missing 
values. Any other missing values or outliers were replaced by the mean of the respective variable where this method 
was applicable. For example, the Total Capital Ratio was not available for a very small number of banks. However, 
since the variation of this variable, over time, is relatively low, we could use the respective average sample values as 
a proxy. 
 
MULTIVARIATE MODEL AND STATISTICAL ANALYSIS 
 
Descriptive Statistics and Analysis 
 
First, the summary statistics of our data set, as outlined in Table 3, is investigated. They provide the reader 
with some interesting insights on the differences between the business models of cooperative and commercial banks 
in Italy. 
 
To begin with, variables measuring the financial performance of commercial banks are more volatile than 
those of cooperative banks, as it is shown by the standard deviation. Several hypotheses have been tested to clarify 
this point. An investigation has been conducted to evaluate whether bank size, income composition and product mix 
increase the volatility of earnings and other ratios within commercial banks. Ultimately, it can be argued that by 
contrast to commercial banks, Italian cooperative banks relate into a consolidated network – the cooperative credit 
network – with a better distribution of financial risks. They are more homogenous within the sample; they also 
engage in fewer and more stable business segments which secures stability in their performance metrics. This result 
involves significant policy implications that will be discussed later in detail. Further implications can be drawn from 
the fact that Italian cooperative banks are successful in the retail banking segment, as it is shown by the 
concentration of loans in their portfolios. In the 2006-2009 period, by contrast to commercial banks and despite the 
ongoing crisis, cooperative banks continued to provide credit liquidity to the market. 
 
As far as the loan portfolio is concerned, the lower LLRGL ratio stresses the efficiency of cooperative 
banks in providing loans as well as their ability to implement better management of loan portfolios than commercial 
banks. This ratio is, on average, higher for commercial banks and with increasing values in the period under 
examination, particularly in the years 2007 and 2008. Management of the loan portfolio in commercial banks only 
improved in 2009. Results suggest that Italian cooperative banks tend to manage their loan portfolios better and are 
particularly effective in retail business. They therefore confirm the validity of similar studies, which show that in 
times of financial and economic distress, Italian cooperative banks have a better quality of the loan-granting process. 
They are also able to implement more efficient recovery processes (Matarocci and Gibilaro, 2008). 
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Table 3:  Sample Means for the Variables in the Data Set for the Different Time Periods (Standard Deviations in Parentheses) 
Source:  Own calculations based on data from BankScope 
 
Variable 2006 2007 2008 2009 
 Sample Sample Sample Sample 
 Cooperative 
Banks 
Commercial 
Banks 
Cooperative 
Banks 
Commercial 
Banks 
Cooperative 
Banks 
Commercial 
Banks 
Cooperative 
Banks 
Commercial 
Banks 
ROE 0,0848 0,0868 0,0957 0,0735 0,0708 0,0036 0,0386 0,0319 
  (0,0290) (0,1043) (0,0284) (0,1510) (0,0260) (0,2302) (0,0257) (0,1068) 
CIR 64,678 66,662 60,709 64,775 64,056 75,571 68,506 72,537 
  (8,1993) (25,652) (7,4877) (21,371) (8,2980) (64,014) (9,6996) (55,273) 
REP 0,0052 1,3274 0,0056 1,4431 0,0046 0,9527 0,0025 0,0009 
  (0,0072) (1,6397) (0,0077) (1,6734) (0,0071) (1,1759) (0,0037) (0,0020) 
NIM 0,0132 0,0030 0,0121 0,0027 0,0113 0,0025 0,0071 0,0018 
  (0,0199) (0,0047) (0,0169) (0,0039) (0,0164) (0,0040) (0,0106) (0,0029) 
NOITAA -0,0010 0,00008 -0,0009 -0,0005 -0,0006 -0,0003 0,0004 -0,0001 
  (0,0015) (0,0023) (0,0016) (0,0011) (0,0011) (0,0007) (0,0063) (0,0010) 
TCR 15,922 14,606 15,708 14,671 15,389 13,7090 14,778 14,982 
 (5,9400) (9,6775) (5,3535) (12,962) (4,7122) (8,7375) (3,3033) (9,7795) 
NLTA 0,7081 0,9770 0,7362 0,9810 0,7401 1,4728 0,7401 0,6256 
  (0,1372) (3,0086) (0,1033) (2,8884) (0,1035) (6,8206) (0,1010) (0,2718) 
NLTDB 1,3527 1,0540 1,4672 1,0886 1,5563 1,0895 1,5108 0,6256 
  (0,3720) (0,6474) (0,3577) (0,7237) (0,4011) (0,5568) (0,3800) (0,5351) 
LLRGL 0,0176 13,028 0,0170 0,1006 0,0183 17,746 0,0189 0,0323 
 (0,0139) (105,78) (0,0140) (0,4842) (0,0121) (144,41) (0,0095) (0,0179) 
LLPNIR 0,0816 0,1621 0,0984 0,2372 0,1468 0,4304 0,2101 0,3568 
  (0,0634) (0,2728) (0,0597) (0,6866) (0,0940) (1,4326) (0,1429) (0,3423) 
LQVT 0,0904 4,1772 0,0932 3,0764 0,0838 0,2340 0,0782 0,2157 
  (0,0837) (32,666) (0,0818) (23,572) (0,0660) (0,2409) (0,0682) (0,2241) 
          
Observations 60 58 57 58 57 58 58 60 60 
International Business & Economics Research Journal – October 2011 Volume 10, Number 10 
© 2011 The Clute Institute  109 
On the other hand, the deterioration of the LLPNIR variable clearly shows that in the period under 
investigation, both groups of banks have been facing substantial risks from distressed borrowers. This would require 
banks to have higher capitalisation as a measure of dealing with unexpected losses. In fact, during the period in 
question, cooperative banks have managed to set aside enough capital as opposed to commercial banks. This result 
is confirmed by the higher total capital ratio held by cooperative banks, based on the Basel guidelines. Arguably, 
cooperative banks, on average, tend to pursue rather conservative policies which result in being socially efficient in 
times of distress due to their positive economic influence. The following interpretation helps shed light on the 
conservative management of capital and reserves - if excessive obligatory reserves and statutory capital 
requirements can damage profits in “normal” times, the ability to accumulate capital is particularly important in 
times of financial distress as bank capital prevents banks from becoming insolvent. 
  
The REP ratio is mainly a measure of asset utilization. In this respect, it shows that, at first sight, 
commercial banks manage their overall assets portfolio better. This is determined both by the fact that this ratio adds 
up the provisions which are much higher in commercial banks and moreover, because the blend of assets in 
commercial banks is more aggressive than the typical loan - bonds portfolio of cooperative banks.  
 
Further insights are obtained by taking the concept of liquidity into account. Liquidity is one of the key 
measures for both the overall bank performance and its contribution to the stability of financial markets. Following 
from Valla et al. (2006), the present analysis centres on the liquidity in individual banks or, in the case of 
cooperative banks, well-consolidated banking networks. As already noted, Italian cooperative banks have substantial 
loan portfolios which enable them to provide credit to customers and SMEs, in particular.  However, under specific 
circumstances, concentration of loans in the asset side of the balance sheet could impair their ability to repay any 
commitments due. This situation is often referred to as the “maturity mismatch”. Commercial banks have been 
tackling this problem in the past years with an increased use of interest-rate swaps, interbank loans and other 
instruments (Hesse and Cihak, 2007; Memmel and Schertler, 2009). The lack of access by cooperative banks to the 
interbank market and the lack of knowledge to use derivatives impairs their position in managing liquidity. One may 
argue that this aspect actually signals a lack of flexibility in the business model adopted by Italian cooperative 
banks. 
 
Overall, the conservative business model of Italian cooperative banks appears to be rather successful in 
times of financial distress. Indeed, in the period under examination, ROE has been stable at around 8-9%, whereas in 
the same period, commercial banks have suffered major losses resulting in lower levels of ROE. These results are 
not surprising, as in a similar study by Baas and Schrooten (2005b) which investigates the profitability of German 
banks during the 1994-2003 period, and shows that, on average, cooperative and popular banks have both more 
stable and higher profitability than commercial banks. It is interesting to observe that a rather different picture 
emerges in 2009 where ROE in both groups is lower than 4%.  
 
In the evaluation of different business models in commercial and cooperative banks, a major issue is that of 
efficiency. As mentioned earlier, empirical results related to this concept cannot be interpreted in a straightforward 
manner. They are open to interpretation. The CIR ratio shows that, on average, cooperative banks are run more 
efficiently than commercial banks. This might be due to the fact that commercial banks have experienced higher 
volatility in their trade portfolios during the crisis, thus producing lower income. These banks operate in a more 
competitive market segment where salaries – a major cost component in the balance sheet – tend to be higher. Table 
4 summarises the differences in the business models of the two banking groups, as described in the current section. 
 
Table 4:  Business Model Blueprint during Financial Distress 
Indicators Cooperative Banks Commercial Banks 
Profitability Stable Volatile 
Typology of activity Retail market Diversified 
Credit business Substantial loan portfolios  Decreasing lending activities 
Quality of investments Both groups face risks 
Capital set aside Conservative policy At regulatory levels 
Operational efficiency Improved operational efficiency Increasing costs 
Asset efficiency Lower income generating asset mix Overall higher asset utilization 
Source:  the authors 
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Model Specification and Estimation 
 
To examine the determinants of bank profitability, two models using pooled OLS and fixed effects (FE) 
regression have been estimated (results are shown in Table 5, at the end of this paragraph). The advantage of 
adopting panel analysis for this study stems from its ability to control individual (bank) heterogeneity and to detect 
relationships that are not observable in pure cross-section and time-series data through the dynamics of adjustment. 
The FE models were estimated using White’s transformation in order to control for heteroskedasticity among the 
cross-sections. While investigating the relationship in question, a number of regressions to control for different 
variables pertinent to bank profitability have been employed. Subsequently, the model boiled down to the following 
equation:   
 
ROE = β1 + β2*NIM + β3*TCR + β4*REP + β5*NLTA + β6*LQVT + β7*LLPNIR 
 
where ROE stands for Return on Equity; NIM stands for Net Interest Margin; TCR stand for Total Capital Ratio; 
REP stands for Recurring Earning Power; NLTA stands for Net Loans on Total Assets; LQVT stands for Liquidity; 
and finally, LLPNIR stands for Loan Loss Provisions on Net Interest Revenue. 
 
A first interpretation of results reveals a number of interesting insights concerning the profitability of banks. 
A summary of the results from the performed regressions is outlined in Table 2. To begin with, the model seems to 
reveal no relationship between the total capital ratio and profitability. This can be interpreted with reference to the 
fact that the required rate of this ratio is determined by the regulatory authorities and this does not leave place for the 
banks to manipulate it. However, in a more detailed research, case studies of banks at the extreme of the TCR values 
ought to be considered, as it is clear that one should expect some kind of a relationship between ROE and 
TCR. Based on the present data, one can conclude that regulatory capital does not have a significant influence on 
ROE. 
 
Moving to the quality of investments, the LLPNIR estimate indicates that profitability in cooperative banks 
is negatively related to this variable, as one would normally expect. This estimate is relevant for both bank groups 
as, on average, their asset portfolios are structured with loans; thus, a small rise in the provisions for losses in loans 
indicates a decrease in profitability. 
 
 
Table 5:  Regression Results 
 
Commercial Banks Cooperative Banks 
OLS FE OLS FE 
Variable (1) (2) (1) (2) 
C  -0.037968  0.112573 
  (0.0460)  (0.0000) 
TCR -0.002009 -0.002077 -0.000158 0.002002 
 (0.0263)** (0.0850)* (0.7050) (0.0021)*** 
NIM -3.076747 14.64754 -4.897328 -7.853180 
 (0.0393)** (0.0135)** (0.0000)*** (0.0000)*** 
LQVT 0.133432 -0.000501 0.157686 0.080619 
 (0.0003)*** (0.0217)** (0.0000)*** (0.0734)* 
REP 0.030956 0.064015 12.77792 17.22024 
 (0.0000)*** (0.0000)*** (0.0000)*** (0.0000)*** 
NLTA 0.089155 -0.006743 0.121847 -0.046711 
 (0.0013)** (0.0000) (0.0000)*** (0.0484)** 
LLPNIR -0.080241 0.013761 -0.189618 -0.219295 
 (0.1659) (0.0003)*** (0.0000)*** (0.0000)*** 
Adj. R-squared 0.361081 0.813683 0.386074 0.715730 
Note: p-values in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
OLS = ordinary least squares estimate; FE = fixed effect estimate; 
Source:  the authors 
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With REP being one of the most important indicators of asset utilization, it appears to be an important 
contributor for the ROE of both bank groups. Considering next the FE estimate of NLTA, results suggest that it is 
negatively related to profitability. Here one can conclude that when accounting for their individual effects, both 
banking groups in the data set tend to show some kind of a diminishing returns effect as their loan portfolio grows 
above a certain threshold. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
This paper developed a model based on data from both commercial and cooperative banks in Italy to test 
for the profitability of banks. For such a model to be useful, it needs to address reality in its conclusions and appraise 
policy implications. With reference to the Italian market, results tend to confirm that major differences exist in the 
business models of cooperative and commercial banks. They originate from the individual features of banks, their 
strategic goals and business philosophies, technical profile, and organisational structure (Ferri, 2008; Groeneveld 
and de Vries, 2009; Tarantola, 2009; EACB, 2010). Also, Italian cooperative credit banks do not engage in the 
interbank market as actively as commercial banks and have therefore been less exposed to the financial crisis.  
 
Such differences persist in times of financial distress. Italian cooperative banks show a remarkable 
efficiency in providing credit to their customers despite the ongoing crisis. Cooperative members, ordinary 
customers and SMEs continue to enjoy access to credit at cooperative banks. Results are thus consistent with the 
argument that relationship banking is particularly efficient in times of financial distress (Boot, 1999; Cesarini, 2003; 
Di Salvo et al, 2004; Ferri, 2008). They have a good management of loan portfolios which appears to be 
qualitatively better than that of commercial banks. A further advantage of cooperative banks is in their ability to 
accumulate capital in distressful times due to conservative business and development policies. This, in turn, lowers 
the risk of insolvency, thereby decreasing related problems such as potential bank-runs. 
 
Despite pointing to a lack of flexibility in their business model, results confirm the positive economic 
contribution of Italian cooperative banks during the 2006-2009 period. Arguably, their presence in the Italian market 
translates into positive outcomes in terms of financial stability. Whereas diversification at financial institutions, for 
instance in the structure of the portfolio, may increase the likelihood of systemic crises (De Jonghe, 2010; Wagner, 
2010), diversification of financial institutions within the market with a better balance of shareholder and stakeholder 
values can have positive effects on financial stability. Although the conclusion here is limited to the Italian market, it 
can be argued that similar results can be expected from research focusing on banks operating in other European 
countries. From the point of view of business development and market-making, it may be particularly fruitful to 
extend the cooperative credit network to countries where cooperative banking is either poorly developed or still 
missing; for instance, new EU member states such as Slovenia or other Central and Eastern European countries. 
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